Abstract-Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) forms a communication network for the collection of power data from smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication within an AMI needs to be secure, public-key cryptography (PKC) can be used to reduce the overhead of key management. However, PKC still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation and management. In particular, distribution and storage of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), which holds the revoked certificates, is a major challenge due to its overhead. To address this challenge, in this paper, we propose a novel revocation management approach by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which reduces the space requirements for revocation information significantly and thus enables efficient distribution of such information to all smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach on both ns-3 network simulator and an actual AMI testbed developed at FIU and demonstrated its superior performance with respect to traditional methods for CRL management.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE existing power grid is currently going through a major transformation to enhance its reliability, resiliency and efficiency by enabling networks of intelligent electronic devices, distributed generators, and dispersed loads [1] , which is referred to as Smart(er) Grid. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) network is one of the renewed components of Smart Grid that helps to collect smart meter data using a twoway communication [2] . Smart meters are typically connected via a wireless mesh network with a gateway (or access point) serving as a relay between the meters and the utility company.
The security requirements for the AMI network are not different from the conventional networks as confidentiality, authentication, message integrity, access control, and nonrepudiation are all needed to secure the AMI. Confidentiality is needed to prevent exposure of customer's private data to unauthorized parties while integrity is needed to ensure that power readings are not changed for billing fraud. Furthermore, authentication is crucial to prevent any compromised smart meters to communicate with other smart meters. As in the case of conventional networks, these requirements can be met by using either symmetric or asymmetric key cryptography. However, in both cases management of the keys is a major issue in terms of automation, efficiency and cost. Due to the huge overhead of maintaining symmetric keys [3] , using public-keys can provide some advantages and makes it easier to communicate with IP-based outside networks when needed [4] . Moreover, according to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is more appropriate for large AMI depending on the number of possible communicating pairs of devices [5] . As an example, companies such as Landis&Gyr and Silver Spring Networks use PKI to provide security for millions of smart meters in the US [6] . In such a PKI, the public-keys for smart meters and utilities are stored in certificates which are issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs) [7] .
For AMI applications there are multiple purposes for employing PKI with the help of certificates. For instance, some AMI applications such as Demand-response require mutual authentication while regular data collection necessitates authentication among smart meters if multi-hop transmission is in place. Moreover, code-signing certificates are needed for firmware management of smart meters. The employment of certificates in all of these cases requires management of them which include the creation, renewal, distribution and revocation. In particular, the certificate revocation and its association with smart meters are critical and have the potential to impact the performance of AMI applications significantly [7] . Therefore, we focus efficient handling of this issue in this paper.
To recap, there are several reasons that necessitate revoking certificates, such as key compromise, certificate compromise, excluding malicious meters, renewing devices, etc. As a result, when processing certificates, one has to check a certificate's revocation status before accepting it. The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is a commonly used method for certificate revocation scheme that keeps the list of revoked certificates serial numbers and revocation dates. The status of a certificate can be determined by checking whether it is in the CRL or not. Considering the large number of smart meters in an AMI and the fact that the expiration period of a certificate is relatively longer (and even lifelong in particular applications [6] ) than that of other conventional systems such as websites [8] , the CRL size will grow significantly as time passes. In addition, there are several known incidents that suddenly cause revocation of so many certificates. For instance, a recent discovery of a chip deficiency on RSA key generation caused revocation of more than 700K certificates of devices which deployed this specific chip [9] and renowned heartbleed vulnerability caused the revocation of millions of certificates, immediately [10] .
The above cases indicate that independent of the aforementioned revocation reasons, if there is a new vulnerability in the used algorithms for certificates, a huge number of revocations arXiv:1902.04255v1 [cs.CR] 12 Feb 2019 may additionally occur. Thus, dealing with the overhead of CRLs become a burden both for the resource-constrained smart meters in terms of storage and for the AMI infrastructure which is typically restricted in terms of bandwidth to distribute these CRLs. The latter is particularly critical since reliability and efficiency of AMI data communication is crucial in the functioning of the distribution systems in power grid. Current solutions such as Online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [11] could not be applied since they are geared for Internet communications to access a remote server each time there is a revocation check request. As AMI infrastructures are not suitable for such solutions in terms of remote access and bandwidth capacity, there is a need to develop a lightweight solution to manage the revocation information without causing too much overhead to the AMI.
In this paper, we propose a communication-efficient revocation scheme for AMI networks by using RSA accumulators [12] . RSA accumulator is a cryptographic tool which is able to represent a set of values with a single accumulator value (i.e., digest a set into a single value). Moreover, it provides a mechanism to check whether an element is in the set or not which implicitly means that cryptographic accumulators can be used for efficient membership testing. Due to the attractiveness of size, in this paper, we adapt RSA accumulators for our needs by introducing several novel elements. Specifically, an accumulator manager within the utility company (UC) is tasked with collection of CRLs from CAs and accumulating these CRLs (i.e., revoked certificates' serial numbers) to a single accumulator value which will then be distributed to the smart meters. Along with the accumulator value, we also introduce and distribute a customized non-revoked proof for allowing a smart meter to check whether another meter's certificate is revoked without a need to refer to the CRL file.
The computation and communication related aspects of the proposed approach is assessed via simulations in ns3 network. In addition, we built an actual testbed at FIU using in-house smart meters to assess the performance realistically. We compared our approach with the other methods that use conventional CRL schemes and Bloom-filters [13] . The results show that the proposed approach significantly outperforms the other existing methods in terms of reducing the communication overhead that is measured with the completion time. The overhead in terms of computation is not major and can be handled in advance within the utility that will not impact the smart meters. This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we summarize the related work. Section III provides the background. In Section IV, we present the proposed approach with its features. Section V is dedicated to experimental validation. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. CRL Management in AMIs
Due to increasing interest in Smart Grid, there has been a number of efforts to study PKI for Smart Grid communication infrastructure. For instance, Metke et al. [4] surveyed the existing key security technologies for extremely large, wide-area communication networks and claimed that the most effective key management solution for securing the Smart Grid, in general, will be based on PKI. The studies [7] , [14] investigated different revocation management aspects such as aspects such as short-lived-certificate scheme, tamper-proof device scheme, OCSP, conventional CRL, and compressed CRL for AMI. However, these studies just state the importance of revocation management for AMI and provide a general overview of how to apply the well-known revocation management techniques to the smart grid. They do not report any experiments that assess the communication overhead due to such approaches. The focus is mostly on revocation check time. The first comprehensive study that focused on the CRL management for AMI was based on Bloom Filters [15] . The size of CRLs was reduced by Bloom Filters. However, Bloom Filters suffer from false positives and may eventually require accessing the actual server to check the validity of a certificate. Our proposed scheme on the other hand never requires accessing a remote server. In [13] , the authors proposed a CRL management scheme based on grouping the smart meters that are within the same neighborhood and likely to communicate with each other. While this approach is good for a specific application, it may limit the number of applications to be run on AMI infrastructure. The study in [16] used distributed hash tables (DHT) to reduce the CRL size. Although this study provides a reduction in CRL size, it suffers from additional inter-meter communication overhead for accessing the CRL information. Our approach does not have such limitations and drawbacks as will be seen when compared with these approaches in Section V.
B. Cryptographic Accumulators
Cryptographic accumulators were first introduced by Benalog and DeMare [17] . After their first appearance, there have been studies [12] , [18] , [19] offering to use them for membership testing. However, these studies solely focused on building the cryptographic fundamentals of accumulators, and thus, omit application specific issues and security features when deploying them. In addition, these studies are offering to use accumulators for membership testing by accumulating a valid list. Considering AMI, accumulation of valid smart meter's certificates to provide a revocation mechanism would constitute a significant overhead due to the fact that revocation frequency is less than that of creating new certificates and number of revoked certificates is also less than the number of valid certificates [10] . Our approach mitigates these drawbacks by addressing security and application specific issues and offering to use CRLs instead of valid certificates.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. Background on Cryptographic Accumulators
Benaloh and De Mare [17] introduced the cryptographic accumulator concept which is a one-way hash function with a special property of being quasi-commutative. A quasicommutative function is a special function F such that
The properties of this function can be summarized as follows: 1) it is a one-way function, i.e., hard to invert; 2) it is a hash function for obtaining a secure digest A (i.e., accumulator value) where A = F(F(F(y 0 , y 1 ), y 2 ), ..., y m ) for a set of values {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ..., y m } ∈ Y; 3) it is a quasi-commutative hash function which is different from other well-known hash functions such that the accumulator value A does not depend on the order of y i accumulations.
These properties allow cryptographic accumulators to be used for a condensed representation of a set of elements. In addition, since the resulting accumulated hashes of y i (Y = {y i ; 0 < i < m}) stays the same even if the order of hashing is changed, it can be used for efficient membership testing by using a special value called witness value w i . For instance, the witness w j of corresponding y j is calculated by accumulating all y i except the case where i = j (e.g., w j = F(F(F(y 0 , y 1 ), ..., y j−1 , y j+1 ..., y m )). Then, when necessary any of the members can check whether y j is also a member of the group by just verifying whether F(w j , y j ) = A. Note that, because F is a one-way function, it would be computationally infeasible to obtain w j from y j and A. However, there is a risk for collusion in this scheme when an adversary can come up with w j and y j pairs where y j / ∈ Y to obtain the same accumulator value: F(w j , y j ) = A. In the literature, there is already a cyrptographic accumulator, namely the RSA construction [20] which guarantees that finding such pairs is computationally hard by restricting the inputs to the accumulator function to be prime numbers only. This scheme is known as collision-free accumulator that enables secure membership testing (i.e., without any collision). Therefore, in this paper, we chose to employ RSA construction which is elaborated next.
B. RSA Accumulator
RSA accumulator [20] has a RSA modulus N = pq, where p and q are strong primes. The RSA accumulation value A is calculated on consecutive modular exponentiation of prime numbers set Y = {y 1 , ..., y n } as follows:
The witness w i of corresponding y i is calculated by accumulating all values except y i :
..,yi−1,yi+1,...,yn (mod N ) (3) Then, the membership testing can be done via a simple exponential operation by comparing the result with the accumulator value A:
C. Certificate, CRL and Delta CRLs As we deal with certificates, we would like to also provide some basic background on certificates and their management. Certificates are issued by a CA with a planned lifetime to an expiration date and have unique serial numbers. Once issued, these certificates are valid until their expiration date. However, there are various reasons that cause a certificate to be revoked before the expiration date. These reasons include but not limited to compromise of the corresponding private key, changing the underlying device infrastructure, etc.
Revocation causes each CA regularly issued a signed list called a CRL which is a time-stamped list consisting of serial numbers of revoked certificates and revocation dates. When a PKI-enabled system uses a certificate (for example, for verifying the integrity of a message), that system should not only check the time validity of the certificate, but an additional check is required to determine a certificate's revocation status during the integrity check. To do so, CRL can be checked to determine the status of the certificate.
There are two main types of CRL: full CRLs and delta CRLs. A full CRL contains the status of all revoked certificates which are not expired yet. Delta CRLs contain only the status of newly revoked certificates that have been revoked after the issuance of the last full CRL and before the new release of it. Therefore, the most recent version of the CRL or delta CRLs is made available to all the potential nodes that will be using it. In the case of AMI, these CRLs need to be accessible to all the smart meters.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH A. Overview
The proposed approach basically eliminates the need to store and distribute CRLs when the devices communicate in a secure manner. Instead of keeping a CRL file for verification of revocation status of certificates, our approach dictates to store at each device (e.g., smart meter, gateway, HES, etc.) only an accumulator value and a proof which proves the validity of the device's certificate. The accumulator value and proof can be computed at the utility company and distributed to devices in advance. Any updates regarding revoked certificates trigger recomputation of these values. Keeping just two integer values for revocation management brings a lot of efficiency in terms of storage and distribution overhead as will be shown in the Experiments section. In the next subsections, we will explain the details of our approach in terms of accumulator and proof computation, system architecture and certificate verification protocol.
B. Modification of RSA Accumulator for Our Case
We propose several modifications to the existing RSA Accumulator so that it can be employed in our settings as listed below.
1) Introducing non-witness Value Generation: In the traditional CRL approach, when a smart meter presents its certificate to the recipient meter, that meter needs to verify that the presented certificate is NOT in the CRL. This is contrary to the membership testing approach we presented within an RSA accumulator. Recall that in that accumulator, the goal was to check whether an element is in a list and to ensure this a witness value should be presented. Therefore, we cannot directly use the RSA accumulator for our case where nonmembership should be checked. To be able to employ the accumulator approach, we will need to generate a non-witness value for the presenter to prove that it is not in the list. To realize the generation of non-witness values, we utilize the work in [21] . The reader is referred to this work for further cryptographic details. With the help of that work, we were able to accumulate the revocation information (stored in CRLs) into a single accumulator value and produce non-membership witnesses for the non-revoked smart meters. Note that the time complexity of this non-membership witness generation is O(n), which is the same as the witness generation described in Eq. 3 where n represents the number of inputs to the accumulator. Therefore, to reduce the computational complexity, we utilize the method proposed in [21] which relies on Extended Euclidean operation to reduce time complexity to O(1).
2) Reducing the Complexity of Accumulator Computation: While computing the accumulator value using Eq. 2, the exponent needs to be computed as n i=1 y i before doing the modular exponentiation. This becomes infeasible when the size of Y increases since n i=1 y i will be n × k bits assuming each y i is a k-bit integer. In our approach, we decided to use Euler's Theorem [22] to cope with this complexity. With access to the totient of N (i.e., φ(N )), the exponent of g in accumulation computation will be n i=1 y i mod φ(N ). Thus, with the knowledge of the totient, it becomes more efficient to compute the accumulator value via reducing the entire exponent by φ(N ).
3) Generating Prime Inputs for the Accumulator: For accumulation, we can use the certificate IDs which are generated by the CAs. However, to ensure a collision-free accumulator, we need to use only prime numbers as dicated by the RSA accumulator. Since CRLs contain arbitrary serial numbers for certificate IDs, it is necessary to compute a prime representative for each certificate ID as an input to the RSA accumulator. Thus, we used the method described in [20] for prime representatives generation from the serial numbers. The advantage of this method is to generate fixed-size (k-bits) prime representatives regardless of the input size.
4) Functions of the Modified RSA Accumulator: After preparing the inputs, we compiled and modified the offered accumulator structure and proposed the following functions to construct revocation management for AMI. Our RSA accumulator uses the following input sets: Y is the set of prime representatives of revoked certificates' serial numbers and X is set of prime representative of valid certificates' serial numbers where x ∈ X :
This function is to setup the parameters of the accumulator. It takes k as an input which represents the length of the RSA modulus in bits (e.g., 2048, 4096, etc.) and generates modulus N along with aux inf o which is basically Euler's totient φ(N ). aux inf o helps to make computation of accumulator and non-membership witnesses faster via Euler's theorem [22] which reduces the size of large exponents.
This is the actual function which accumulates revocation information by taking prime representatives of serial numbers set Y. While computing the accumulator value, we propose to use an initial random secret prime number r k as a first exponent (g r k ). This is for preventing an adversary to make a guess about accumulated serial numbers by utilizing publicly available information about certificate serial numbers.
This function first computes a pair of non-witness values represented as (nw 1 , nw 2 ) for a valid certificate whose prime representative is x. Then, the UC concatenates the non-witness value pair with x and the serial number of the certificate creating a 4-tuple called nr proof .
The UC then signs this tuple. By signing this tuple, the UC ensures that it is produced by the UC itself. This scheme prevents using any stolen nw 1 & nw 2 values by an adversary. Moreover, it prevents a possible fake non-witness generation attack when an advanced adversary has theprime number generation algorithm and the CRL information.
• 0, 1 ← RevocationCheck(A, nr proof ): When a smart meter which has a prime representative x wants to authenticate itself to another party, the other one uses nr proof and A to verify that x is not in the accumulated revocation list by checking whether A nw1 = nw 2 x × g (mod N ) holds. Note that nr proof contains all the required information for this computation as it includes nw 1 & nw 2 and the prime representative x.
This function is for updating the accumulator value A when the revocation information is updated via deltaCRLs. It takes a set of prime representatives of corresponding newly revoked certificates Y t and latest accumulator value A t−1 , and returns the new accumulator value A t .
• nr proof
This function is for updating the non-revoked proof of corresponding valid smart meters when the revocation information is updated via deltaCRLs. It takes a set of prime representatives of corresponding newly revoked certificates Y t , the updated accumulator value A t , and the prime representative x and returns non-revoked proof nr proof t of smart meter after some additional certificates are revoked. Next, we define the components of the proposed framework.
C. Components of Revocation Management System
We propose the system architecture shown in Figure 1 to enable the proposed revocation management and to define its interaction with the deployed AMI components. In addition, the newly introduced components of this architecture and their roles in executing the above defined functions are described below: Fig. 1 . The structure of proposed revocation management.
• Smart Meters and Gateway: The smart meters and gateway can directly communicate with each other and with Head-end System (HES) over LTE. Thus, to ensure the security of applications, these devices need to run the RevocationCheck() function and carry the latest A and the corresponding nr proof .
• Head-End System: HES is an interface between the utility operations center and smart meters, and it is located in a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The primary function of the HES is collecting the power data from smart meters and transfer them to head-end management servers (HMS).
Since it has two-way communication with smart meters, it needs to run the RevocationCheck() function and carry the latest A and its nr proof .
• CRL Collector: The CRL collector plays one of the key roles in our revocation management system. It basically collects CRLs from various CAs and feeds them to the Accumulator Manager. Since it has an open interface to the outside network (communicating with other CAs), it is placed in DMZ area.
• Accumulator Manager: Accumulator Manager is the core of our revocation management scheme. It gets CRL information from the CRL Collector and accumulates them to obtain latest accumulator value. It implements the Setup(), ComputeAcc(), ComputeNonRevokedProof(), UpdateAcc(), and UpdateNonRevokedProof() functions. Whenever a new accumulator value is calculated at a time t, it sends the accumulator value A t and updated nr proof t to the HMS which then forwards them to HES for distributing to the smart meters. Note that the security of Accumulator Manager is critical since it holds both the accumulator and RSA settings (i.e., aux inf o and p&q). Therefore, it should not have any outgoing traffic. In case, the security of these parameters cannot be ensured, they can be either deleted (once they are used initially) or outsourced to third parties. In such cases, the computation of the accumulator and nr proof can still be accomplished without using those parameters but it may be much more computationally intensive as will be shown in the Experiments Section.
• Head End Management Server: The collected data is managed within HMS. It basically monitors activity logs, identifies new devices and manages incident response processes. As mentioned, the HMS collects the newly generated A and nr proof values and sends them to HES for distribution.
D. Revocation and Certificate Verification Processes
In this section, we describe the proposed revocation scheme and the protocol for certificate verification.
1) Accumulating the CRL: This process includes two phases namely the setup phase and the update phase which are described below.
• The setup phase: In this phase of our approach, the Accumulator Manager in the UC basically accumulates the revoked certificate IDs in full CRLs. This process works as follows: The full CRL files are read, and each certificate ID and its issuer's public key are concatenated to obtain a unique string that will be input to the accumulator. Note that the issuer's public key is concatenated on purpose to eliminate any duplicates in serial numbers that may come from different CAs. Then, the Accumulator Manager calculates prime representatives for each concatenated string and accumulates these prime representatives to obtain the accumulator value. Finally, the Accumulator Manager generates non-revoked proofs (i.e., the 4-tuple nr proof ) for each end-device (smart meter, gateway, HES, etc.) by using ComputeN onRevokedP roof () function.
• The update phase: This phase is for revocation information updates that can be done through delta CRLs. Due to such updates, the accumulator value A and nr proof values should be updated. To update these values, the Accumulator Manager first prepares the prime representatives for the newly revoked certificates (i.e., the ones that are included in the delta CRLs) by following the same approach in the setup phase. It then updates the previously computed accumulator value, A t−1 , by using the U pdateAcc() function to obtain A t which is then used to generate new nr proof tuples for the end devices by using the U pdateN onRevokedP roof () function. 2) Certificate Verification Protocol: When two meters communicate by sending/receiving signed messages, the signatures in these messages need to be verified. To be able to start the verification process, a receiving device needs to use the public key (for signature verification) presented in the certificate sent to itself. To ensure that this certificate is not revoked, then it needs to initiate a process which we call as certificate verification protocol. Figure 2 shows an overview of this process. Basically, the receiving device checks the corresponding nr proof tuple's signature to ensure that it is produced by the UC. Once the signature is verified, it then checks whether the the serial number within the tuple is same as the serial number of the provided certificate (i.e., either EndDevice#1.cer). For additional security, it also checks the length of the nw 1 &nw 2 to see whether it is equal to the first accumulation setup parameter k. Finally, by performing RevocationCheck() function, it checks whether the provided nr proof is correct. If all these steps are successful, the enddevice has successfully complete the certificate verification protocol.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. Experimental Setup
To assess the performance of the proposed approach, we implemented it in C++ by using FLINT [23] , which is the fastest library for number theory and modular arithmetic operations over large integers. For the RSA modulus generation and prime representatives computation, we used Crypto++ library since it allows thread-safe operations. We prepared a binary-encoded full CRL and delta CRL that have been digitally signed according to RFC 5280 standard and contained 30,000 and 1000 revoked certificates for full CRL and delta CRL respectively. The full CRL was used to compute A and nr proof tuples during the setup phase while the delta CRL ws used for updating both A and nr proof tuples.
For communication overhead assessment, we used the wellknown ns-3 simulator [24] which has a built-in implementation of IEEE 802.11s mesh network standard. The underlying MAC protocol used was 802.11g. We created two different AMI grid topologies that consist of 81 and 196 smart meters. Finally, for more realistic results, we built an IEEE 802.11s-based mesh network comprised of 18 Protronix Wi-Fi dongles attached to Raspberry-PIs which are integrated with the inhouse meters as shown in Fig. 3a . While building the testbed on the third floor in the Engineering Center of FIU, we carefully dispersed the meters on the floor as shown in Fig.  3b . To enable multi-hop communications among meters, we decreased the Tx-Power by a factor of 16 to limit their transmission range. By such positioning and decreased TxPower, we strive to mimic realistic conditions that reflect the path attenuation, refraction, and diffraction of the signal.
B. Baselines and Performance Metrics
We investigated the communication and computation overhead of our approach by using the following metrics:
• Completion Time: This metric is defined for communication overhead assessment, which indicates the total elapsed time to complete the distribution of accumulator value and non-revoked proofs to the smart meters from the HES. This metric hints on the communication overhead of revocation management in terms of assessing how it keeps the communication channels busy which are critical for carrying other information.
• Computation Time: This is the metric to measure the total time for completing the required computations such as computation of accumulator value, prime representatives, and revocation check time, etc.
• Storage: This metrics indicates the amount of space for storing the CRL information in the meters. For comparison to our approach, we used two other baselines from the literature:
• Traditional CRL Method: Each smart meter keeps the whole CRL [14] locally which is distributed by the UC.
• Bloom Filter Method: A Bloom filter [13] is used to store revoked certificates information. Note that, we employed murmur hash function, which is a non-cryptographic hash function suitable for fast hash-based lookup, to build this Bloom filter. In this case, the Bloom Filter is distributed to each meter by the UC.
C. Communication Overhead
As the main objective of our work was to improve the efficiency of the distribution of the CRLs, we first conducted the communication related experiments to assess the performance of our approach.
1) CRL Distribution Overhead: In this subsection, we report on the completion time for the CRL distribution of our approach with respect to other baselines both in simulation and testbed environments. The results which are shown in Fig. 4 indicate the accumulator approach significantly reduces the completion time compared to local CRL and bloom filter approaches due to condense accumulating. Even with respect to Bloom filter, which is touted as one of the most efficient methods in the literature, our approach reduced the completion time in approximately more than 10 orders of magnitude.
Another critical observation from the simulation results is the scalability capabilities of our approach. While especially for the local CRL approach, the completion time increases significantly, this is not the case for our approach. This can be attributed to the fact that the accumulator value is independent of the revoked CRL size while the overhead of other methods is proportional to the CRL size. The main overhead of our approach is directly related to the accumulator setting which was 2048 bits in our case. Therefore, even for very large-scale deployments that can have millions of meters, the overhead will not be impacted. In analyzing the experiments results for the testbed, we observe that the completion time takes more time even though the network size is much smaller. This is mainly because of the signal propagation issues such as path attenuation, refraction, interference from other devices, etc. within the building which does not exist in ns-3 simulations. Such issues cause more errors and packet loss and thus increase the re-transmissions to complete all packet distributions. In fact, the AMI infrastructure might have a similar challenge depending on the geographical location (e.g., urban vs rural environments) and thus the distribution of CRL will become even more critical. Therefore, our approach will be more suitable for such environments to reduce the impact from the wild.
2) CRL Update Overhead: In this subsection, we conducted experiments to assess the overhead of CRL updates assuming that such updates are done regularly using the delta CRL concept. Fig. 5 shows revocation update overhead in terms of the completion time. As in the case of full CRL, our approach significantly outperforms others due to of the size of the delta CRL. approach. This can be explained as follows: For each updated revocation information, the Bloom filters must be created from scratch to carry both previous and newly revoked certificates. As a result, updating the CRL will take slightly more time than the whole CRL distribution for Bloom filter and thus will take more time than the local CRL approach. Note that the overhead of CRL distribution is proportional to the size of the delta CRL and thus the completion time follows a similar trend with the results in Fig. 4 .
For the testbed results, we observe a similar which consistent with the simulations. Again, the completion time is more due to signal propagation and interference issues.
D. Computation Overhead
We have demonstrated in the previous subsection that our approach significantly reduces the communication overhead. But, we need to also assess whether such a reduction introduces any major computational overhead. Thus, in this subsection, we investigated a detailed computational overhead of our approach. Specifically, we conducted two types of experiments: 1) We assessed the overhead of the computations due to the accumulation process in the Accumulator Manager. These experiments were conducted on a computer which has 64-bit 2.2GHz CPU with 10 hardware cores, and 32 GB of RAM assuming that these are reasonable assumptions for the computer that will act as the Accumulator Manager. Moreover, we also investigated whether some of these computations can be parallelized to further reduce the computation times through multi-thread implementations; and 2) We assessed the computation time for the RevocationCheck() function in meters by implementing it in a Raspberry Pi (smart meter).
1) Overhead Results for the Accumulator Manager: In this subsection, we present and discuss the overhead at the Accumulator Manager by considering the functions below:
Computing Prime Representatives: To assess the computational overhead of prime representative generation, we computed prime representatives for different set sizes. Note that since both the valid and revoked certificates serial numbers are used Fig. 6 . Prime representative computation in our approach, the input size can become huge when AMI scales. Therefore, we also conducted a benchmark test by using threads to show the parallelization ability of our approach. The results are shown in Fig. 6 . As can be seen, the computational complexity of the prime representative generation is not overwhelming. 10 5 representatives can be computed nearly in 1 minute even using a single core. Parallelization reduces the computational complexity by roughly 10 folds which allows computational times in the order of seconds.
Computing the Accumulator Value: Next, we benchmark the computation cost of accumulator value according to different CRL sizes as used in the previous experiment. In addition, we also conducted tests to assess the computational difference between our setting (i.e., the Accumulator Manager has all aux inf o information) and the case where the Accumulator Manager does not have aux inf o as discussed in Section IV.C. Note that for the computation of the accumulator value, a parallel implementation was not possible since each step in the computation depends on the previous operation.
As seen in Fig. 7 , the accumulator value is calculated under a minute for 10 5 revoked certificates even without using aux inf o . However, the availability of aux inf o significantly reduces the computation time making it possible to finish it milliseconds regardless of the size of the CRL.
Computing Non-Revoked Values: Finally, we assessed the overhead of the computation of non-revoked proofs for both the first setup phase by using full CRL and the update phase by using delta CRL. Again, we conducted tests based on the availability/lack of aux inf o and parallelization ability. Fig. 8 shows the computation overhead of this function according to different AMI sizes. We repeated the same experiment for the U pdateN onRevokedP roof () function and observed the same trends since the only change was the size of the CRL (i.e., delta CRL is much smaller). These results were not shown due to space constraints.
2) Overhead Results for Revocation Check: Finally, we looked at the computational time overhead for checking whether a certificate is revoked or not based on the three approaches compared. As can be seen in Table I , the elapsed time for a single revocation check is around 10 milliseconds in our approach. Comparing with the other methods, the Bloom Filter has the best results as expected because it enables faster checking by efficient hash operations. However, Bloom filter suffers from false-positives which degrades its efficiency by requiring access to the server [13] . Our approach does not have such a problem. We observe that our approach has comparable results with the local CRL method which requires a simple text search over complete full CRL file. 
E. Storage Overhead
To compare the storage requirements, we identified the needed revocation information size for our approach and compared it with the other approaches, as shown in Table II . As expected, accumulator has a superior advantage since smart meters just need to store a small accumulator value and nonrevoked proof value. Local CRL, on the other hand, keeps the whole CRL list and depending on the number of revoked certificates, it can be huge. For our scenario, the CRL size is around 0.7MB for 30K revoked certificates. While Bloom filter's performance is also promising, it is still not better than our approach and it suffers from false positives as discussed. VI. CONCLUSION Considering the overhead of certificate and CRL management in AMI networks, in this paper, we proposed a one-way cryptographic accumulator based approach for maintaining and distributing the revocation information. The framework condenses the CRLs into a short accumulator value and builds a secure, efficient and lightweight revocation mechanism in terms of communication overhead. The approach is inspired from cryptographic accumulators and adopted based on the requirements of AMI. The experiment results indicate that the proposed approach can reduce the distribution completion time significantly for compared to CRL and Bloom filter approaches while introducing only minor additional computational overhead which is handled by the UC. There is no overhead imposed to smart meters.
